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LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 2011: 
BAKER V. CARR AFTER 50 YEARS: 
APPRAISING THE REAPPORTIONMENT 
REVOLUTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Jonathan L. Entin†
Baker v. Carr1 held that challenges to state legislative 
apportionment systems were subject to scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Over the next two years, the Supreme Court 
applied this holding in a series of cases that articulated the principle 
of one person, one vote for elections to Congress and state 
legislatures.2 As a result, redistricting and reapportionment have
become regular features of American political and legal life. Every 
ten years, in the aftermath of the constitutionally mandated decennial 
census,3 seats in the House of Representatives are reallocated and the 
† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, and Professor of Law and 
Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislative districts); Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional districts); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) 
(primary elections to nominate candidates for U.S. Senate and statewide offices).
3 The political stakes of the decennial census have generated a fair amount of litigation. 
See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002); Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of 
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999); Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996); 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 
(1992).
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boundaries of state and local legislative districts must be redrawn. 
This process in turn has led to a steady stream of litigation.4
To mark the fiftieth anniversary of Baker v. Carr, the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review assembled a diverse group of legal 
scholars and social scientists to consider the meaning and 
implications of that landmark decision.5 The symposium was made 
possible in part by a generous grant from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, for which both the Law 
Review and the Case Western Reserve University School of Law are 
extremely grateful. This issue contains articles that were presented at 
the daylong conference.6
The first set of articles addresses the relationship between Baker v. 
Carr and Bush v. Gore,7 the case that effectively resolved the 2000 
presidential election. Nelson Lund begins by focusing on the Supreme 
Court’s debate in Baker v. Carr and the cases that built on it.8
Although he briefly addresses Justice Frankfurter’s well-known 
argument that these cases should have been dismissed as presenting 
nonjusticiable political questions, Professor Lund emphasizes instead 
Justice Harlan’s substantive critique of the Court’s equal protection 
analysis. Accepting that analysis despite what he regards as its 
obvious weaknesses, Professor Lund explains why Baker’s equal 
protection analysis necessarily supports the result in Bush v. Gore.
Recognizing that his view does not enjoy broad support among legal 
scholars, he goes on to explain why, even if Baker v. Carr had not 
come out as it did, the result in Bush v. Gore was consistent with pre-
Baker jurisprudence about voting rights. 
Next, Daniel Tokaji and Owen Wolfe explain the ramifications of 
Baker v. Carr not only for legislative districting but also for federal 
judicial involvement in election administration, a development that 
builds on Bush v. Gore despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to rely 
4 See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
5 Case Western Reserve University School of Law has a modest connection to the 
reapportionment litigation. Two years before Baker v. Carr was decided, in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama law that 
gerrymandered African American voters out of Tuskegee, Alabama. The Court invoked 
Gomillion in Baker. See 369 U.S. at 229–31. One of the lawyers who argued Gomillion was 
Fred Gray, a 1954 graduate of this law school. See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Of Squares and 
Uncouth Twenty-Eight-Sided Figures: Reflections on Gomillion v. Lightfoot After Half a 
Century, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 133 (2010).
6 The symposium is also available on the Internet. See Live Webcast, CASE WESTERN 
RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.case.edu/lectures/webcast.aspx?dt=20111104 
(last visited June 4, 2012).
7 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
8 Nelson Lund, From Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, and Back, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
947 (2012).
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on that ruling.9 Tokaji and Wolfe contend that both cases opened the 
federal courts to litigation about issues that previously had been left 
largely to the states. Although noting the potential tensions between 
state and federal courts, they regard these developments as salutary 
because state electoral institutions—including many state courts—are 
in the hands of political partisans rather than those of independent
officials who enjoy functional independence. Federal judges, although 
they are chosen through a political process, are more insulated from 
the vicissitudes of day-to-day partisan politics than are their state 
counterparts and state election officials.
The last article in this part of the issue builds on this aspect of 
Tokaji and Wolfe’s analysis. Candice Hoke observes that one 
consequence of the controversy over Bush v. Gore was the adoption 
of the Help America Vote Act,10 which was designed to prevent some
of the ballot problems that gave rise to the dispute over Florida’s 
2000 electoral votes by encouraging the states to invest in new voting 
technology. Professor Hoke explains the accuracy, accountability, and 
security flaws that computer scientists and other engineering experts 
have discovered in these systems and suggests ways for lawyers and 
courts to use those findings to make reliable improvements in our 
election system.11 She observes that the technical problems that have 
emerged raise questions that go well beyond ballot integrity and 
involve threats to meaningful access to an effective franchise.
The next set of articles comes from social scientists who address 
two issues related to the one person, one vote principle. The first 
concerns how Baker v. Carr might affect the drawing of district lines 
for partisan advantage, while the second focuses on the relative 
political power of individual voters, which was a central concern for 
the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.
The initial contribution in this section comes from my political 
science colleague Justin Buchler, who analyzes districting strategies 
in the wake of Baker v. Carr.12 Professor Buchler explains that the 
Supreme Court’s requirement of equal population constrains the 
ability of shrewd partisans to maximize their control of legislative 
bodies, but population equality alone cannot eliminate jockeying for 
partisan advantage in the districting process. He demonstrates 
9 Daniel Tokaji & Owen Wolfe, Baker, Bush, and Ballot Boards: The Federalization of 
Election Administration, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969 (2012).
10 Pub. L. No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 
(2006)).
11 Candice Hoke, Judicial Protection of Popular Sovereignty: Redirecting Voting 
Technology, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997 (2012).
12 Justin Buchler, Population Equality and the Imposition of Risk on Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1037 (2012).
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mathematically how sophisticated legislative mapmakers can seek to 
pack as many voters of the minority party into a relatively small 
number of districts while dispersing their own supporters in a way 
that could give the majority party a disproportionately large number 
of seats. He then turns to an empirical analysis of redistricting and 
finds that those who control the process typically do not seek to 
extract the maximum possible partisan advantage. Professor Buchler 
suggests that real-world political parties are somewhat more risk 
averse than they need to be, and he suggests some explanations for 
this phenomenon.
In the next article, Thomas Brunell examines the implications of 
the Supreme Court’s greater tolerance for population deviations 
between state legislative districts than between congressional 
districts.13 Professor Brunell shows that majority parties have taken 
advantage of this judicial flexibility to pack supporters of the minority 
party into somewhat more populous state legislative districts while 
spreading their own supporters among somewhat less populous 
districts. Because the population deviations among the districts fall 
within the limits that the Supreme Court has at least implicitly 
accepted, majority parties have managed to obtain a 
disproportionately large share of state legislative seats. Brunell 
recognizes the limitations of the absolute-equality standard but 
contends that it is preferable to the current judicial approach.
The last piece in this part analyzes why, despite Baker v. Carr,
individual votes continue to have unequal weight in several important 
respects. John Griffin and Brian Newman show that Baker v. Carr
might have reduced the degree of voter inequality but did not 
eliminate the phenomenon. Voting power on this view is not simply a 
function of the number of persons in a district but rather a mix of 
factors including age, race, party affiliation, and (as the two previous 
articles underscore) the partisan composition of a district. Professors 
Griffin and Newman show that voters who are more powerful in this 
more nuanced sense tend to have congressional representatives who 
more closely support their preferred policies than do less powerful 
voters. They conclude by considering a range of potential reforms that 
13 Thomas L. Brunell, The One Person, One Vote Standard in Redistricting: The Uses and 
Abuses of Population Deviations in Legislative Redistricting, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 
(2012). Compare Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1983) (requiring virtually absolute 
equality in population for all congressional districts in a state), and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (emphasizing the vital importance of population equality for all congressional 
districts in a state), with White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763–64 (1973) (allowing deviation of 
9.9 percent for state legislative districts), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577–78 (1964) 
(suggesting that courts should show more flexibility for deviations from equality for state 
legislative districts than for congressional districts).
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might reduce disparities in voting power among different segments of 
the population.
The final set of articles has a broad interdisciplinary focus. 
Michael Solimine, a law professor, examines the institutional context 
of Baker v. Carr and its aftermath, both immediate and long-term.14
Professor Solimine first addresses the political context in which the 
case arose, noting the executive branch’s involvement in the case 
through an amicus curiae brief and pointing out Solicitor General 
Archibald Cox’s ambivalence about the case despite the view of 
President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
that the case could reap significant political benefits for the 
Democratic Party. He also explores the solicitor general’s role in 
subsequent reapportionment cases, both those that extended and 
implemented Baker and those arising under the Voting Rights Act.15
From there he considers the ultimately ineffectual opposition to the 
Supreme Court’s reapportionment jurisprudence, offering a more 
detailed account of the failed efforts to repudiate that jurisprudence 
through a constitutional amendment or by elimination of federal court 
jurisdiction over reapportionment issues. Solimine also examines how 
the elimination of three-judge federal district courts managed to leave 
exceptions for voting rights and reapportionment cases, and he 
explains how the special procedures for direct appeals from three-
judge courts to the Supreme Court helped to insulate Baker v. Carr
from those who sought to repudiate that ruling.
Margo Anderson, a social and urban historian, puts Baker v. Carr
and its progeny into broader context.16 She begins with an account of 
the origins of the Census Clause17 and the political conflicts that arose 
as a result of changing demographic patterns over the succeeding 
century and a half. Professor Anderson then turns to the implications 
of the reapportionment cases for the census itself, because it quickly 
became apparent that the legal demands imposed by judicial rulings 
required the Bureau of the Census to provide sophisticated data for 
the entire nation to facilitate the drawing of districts that could satisfy 
the one person, one vote rule. This led to the enactment of Public Law 
94–171,18 which authorized the Census Bureau to cooperate with state 
14 Michael E. Solimine, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Path of Reapportionment 
Litigation, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109 (2012).
15 Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 
1973bb–1 (2006)).
16 Margo Anderson, Baker v. Carr, the Census, and the Political and Statistical 
Geography of the United States: The Origins and Impact of Public Law 94–171, 62 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1153 (2012).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
18 Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–171, 89 Stat. 1023 (codified as an amendment to 
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officials to produce data for small areas needed for compliance with 
the new constitutional districting standards. This in turn led to 
increasing concern for the accuracy of census data, particularly the 
problem of differential undercount that had disproportionate effects 
on certain types of communities and some segments of the 
population. Professor Anderson traces the legal and political 
controversy over these issues and shows how the Census Bureau has 
tried to improve the accuracy of the decennial enumeration.
In the last article, Micah Altman and Michael McDonald critically 
analyze the concept of equality reflected in Baker v. Carr and other 
one person, one vote cases.19 These cases did promote districts 
containing equal population, but often at the cost of dividing 
traditional communities and producing oddly shaped constituencies 
that fail the tests of compactness and contiguity. Altman and 
McDonald review several types of redistricting approaches, including 
process-based rules that focus on how lines are drawn, outcome-based 
rules that emphasize substantive electoral results, and institution-
based rules that address who actually draws the lines. In the end, all 
of these approaches have failed to eliminate the manipulation of 
district boundaries. Accordingly, these scholars ask whether 
technology might work better. Although they sympathize with efforts 
to bring technology to bear on this issue, Altman and McDonald warn 
that technology cannot eliminate jockeying for political advantage in 
the reapportionment process. At the same time, technology holds the 
promise of promoting greater transparency and encouraging public 
participation in a process that has long been dominated by politicians 
and party officials.
Baker v. Carr helped to transform American politics in 
fundamental ways, but in so doing opened up many new issues about 
the meaning and nature of representation that remain unresolved after 
half a century. The scholars who contributed to this issue do not offer 
easy solutions for intractable problems. They do offer sophisticated 
insights into why those problems remain intractable that can help 
informed citizens to think more clearly about the competing 
considerations in any districting system.
13 U.S.C. § 141 (2006)).
19 Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting Principles for the Twenty-First 
Century, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1179 (2012).
